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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DONALD W. YORK, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
KENNETH V. SHULSEN, Warden, 
UTAH STATE PRISON and DAVID L. 
WILKINSON, Attorney General, 
STATE OF UTAH. 
Respondents/Appellees. 
Case Number: 920378 CA 
Priority 3 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff petitions for a Rehearing because court based it's 
ruling on wrong issues. Plaintiff alleges issues to rule on are: 
Did trial court exhaust every reasonable, available and recommended 
effort to determine Plaintiff's state of mind at time of crime. 
Did trial court protect Plaintiff's due process. Did habeas court 
determine, by the record, if trial court had protected all of 
Plaintiff's due process rights . 
INACCURATE ACCOUNT OF FACTS 
There was never a presentation of facts or evidence against 
Plaintiff at the plea and therefore there is no established 
statement of the facts. The state used dialogue from a deposition 
of Dr. Alma Carlisle which was not published or used by either the 
state or plaintiff in the habeas hearing. The state also mis-
stated, distorted and erroneously reported statements from the 
police reports. The court, by relying on the state's account, 
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further distorts the account. The Plaintiff feels clarification is 
needed for these statements. 
1. Only Don York's name was looked for on the flight roster. 
No one knew he was a MPD let alone that he used the name Dan Hell/ 
or Hill. 
2. Plaintiff called the house before he came and talked with 
Pat and Anita. (Habeas P26 L 2-6) 
3. The house was in Plaintiff's name, he paid all the 
expenses, his Utah business office was in the home, Pat had her own 
home down the street in her maiden name.(Habeas, P 21 L 5-7) 
4. The police found only 7 shell casings in the bedroom. No 
other casings were found by the police.(Habeas Exh. E) 
5. Jeff Longhurst was found laying half-way out of the front 
door with the gun and empty clip at his feet. The gun and clip had 
Jeff Longhurst's fingerprints and another person's (not Mr. York's) 
on them. Paraffin tests of Jeff Longhurst's hands indicated he had 
fired a gun.(Habeas Exh. E, C). 
6. Plaintiff went to the police station because he thought 
there had been a fight because he had blood on him.(Habeas P 26 L 
2-6) . 
7. Plaintiff was taken to Lakeview Hospital because of heart 
problems (stress related) where they did a blood test, (muscle 
damage) trace metal test (holding gurney rails made inconclusive) 
paraffin test, both hands and arms (no gun powder).(Habeas. P30, 
L17-24)(Habeas Exh, B, C, E,). 
8. Angle of wounds into Pat York and Jeff Longhurst could not 
have resulted from the position witness, Anita Humphries, states 
Mr. York fired the gun. No shell casings were found where Ms. 
Humphries states Mr. York fired the gun.(Habeas Exh. E). 
9. Mr. York came to his home to deliver $3,000 Anita needed to 
pay off credit card charges and avoid criminal charges being filed 
against her and to give Pat York $2,000 so she and Jeff Longhurst 
could move to California. The police reports mention the $5,000 in 
travelers checks found on the hall floor where Mr. York had thrown 
them.(Habeas Exh. D)(Habeas. P 26 L 7-10). 
10. A police officer asked Mr. York if he knew Jeff was dead 
and he replied MNo, I didn't know that. That's to bad." Then a 
few minutes later asked another officer how Pat was and later asked 
same officer how Jeff was. (Habeas Exh. D, E) He told officer he 
was Donald W. York and wouldn't say anything without lawyer. Later 
he boasts the police couldn't catch him and says he'll go to 
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hell. (Habeas Exh. B, D, E) None of these reports have been verified 
by cross examination and there is the possibility of error. It is 
not uncommon for a person hearing a statement that doesn't make 
sense to them, to restructure the sentence in recall, into a form 
that does make sense to them. Plaintiff's alter personality was 
named Dan Hell who didn't like the church Don belonged to, and Dan 
was trying to get control. 
POINT I 
I. TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE EXHAUSTED EVERY REASONABLE, 
AVAILABLE AND RECOMMENDED EFFORT TO DETERMINE 
PLAINTIFF'S STATE OF MIND AT THE TIME OF CRIME. 
The court has erred, as has the state, in consistently arguing 
that the issue is to determine if the trial court should have held 
a competence hearing at time of plea hearing and was Plaintiff 
competent. They fail to realize the issue is denying Plaintiff his 
due process by not pursuing the Dr.'s recommended additional 
investigation into his memory loss. They fail to acknowledge that 
the trial court had a responsibility to determine if Plaintiff had 
grounds for an insanity defense, because the evaluations were 
ordered for use in an insanity defense not a competency hearing. 
It is possible for a person to be so mentally unstable when a 
crime is committed as to be considered insane then return to a more 
normal state after the crime. Therefore, by failing to order the 
Dr.s to pursue their investigation as requested by both Dr.s the 
trial court denied the Plaintiff due process. A careful 
examination of the full evaluation of both Dr.s provides the 
following: 
1 They had difficulty determining how to identify the 
Plaintiff's dysfunction and settled for Borderline Personality but 
were not definite with it. 
The diagnostic category seems to give me the most 
trouble...Currently, the diagnosis that encompasses this 
very descriptive disorder is borderline 
personality.(Habeas Exhibit 2) 
3 
Diagnostically, he fits the borderline personality 
disorder closer than anything else.(Habeas Exhibit 1) 
2 Both identified the Plaintiff's memory loss: 
...
lf[S]ince he states that he has a hiatus or a memory 
loss."...(Habeas Exhibit 2) 
"However, he continues to complain of sometimes 
blackouts, inability to recall certain episodes during 
periods of trauma as well as during the so called normal 
functioning periods."(Habeas Exhibit 1) 
"There is a possibility he was suffering from 
intermittent amnesic episodes because of the trauma of 
the incident..."(Habeas Exhibit 1) 
3 Both mention possible brain damage and identify possible 
cause: 
..."[T]here is evidence in the records ...a couple 
of accidents where there was some brain injury..." (Habeas 
Exhibit 1) 
"The diagnostic dilemma also leads one into another 
area of this person's dysfunction and that is the 
possibility, where albeit minimal, is that of some 
organic pathology."(Habeas Exhibit 2) 
..."[0]ne would have to reckon with the possibility 
of a person having some kind of rare 'seizure-like' 
activity in the brain that might render them 
incapacitated for periods of time..." (Habeas Exhibit 2) 
4. Both recommend further examinations to determine 
Plaintiff's state of mind at time of accident and obtain a more 
accurate diagnosis: 
..."[A]nd the only way this would be resolved would 
be with a totally complete neurologic examination..." 
(Habeas Exhibit 2) 
"It is my opinion that further examination is in 
order, including brain scan and electroencephalograph to 
rule out any possible after effects."(Habeas Exhibit 1) 
The Plaintiff alleges that the trial court did not exhaust 
every reasonable effort to determine his mental condition at time 
crime was committed; and had he ordered the Dr.s to continue their 
examinations, as they recommended, the Dr.s would, most probably, 
have discovered Plaintiff suffered from MPD, as Dr. Carlisle did. 
With that diagnosis the trial court would have, most likely, sent 
the Plaintiff to the state hospital for treatment where he likely 
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would have integrated, as he did in the prison. When he was 
integrated he would have been remanded back to court for trial, 
which is what he is seeking now. By the trial court not allowing 
the Dr.'s to complete the evaluation, he thereby denied the 
Plaintiff his defense and his due process. 
..4"[A] conviction may nevertheless be challenged by 
collateral attack in 'unusual circumstances,' that is 
where an obvious injustice or a substantial and 
prejudicial denial of a constitutional right has 
occurred, (cert omitted)...Such a circumstance exists 
when there is a substantial likelihood that had certain 
evidence been available at the time of trial, a different 
verdict would have resulted.11 (emphasis added) Stewart v. 
State by and through Deland. 830 P.2d 305, 309 (Utah App. 
1992) 
The Plaintiff has always alleged that the trial court should 
have ordered the examining Dr.'s to continue their examination to 
provide him with the answers he had requested and by so doing they 
would have discovered Plaintiff was suffering from MPD. This would 
most likely have resulted in the trial court holding a competency 
hearing and his finding Plaintiff in need of treatment before a 
trial could be held. 
Such a hearing (competency) Mis not required if there is 
a pre-plea determination of competence based on a 
psychiatric evaluation and no new factual issues 
pertaining to competence are raised in the motion to 
withdraw the plea."(emphasis added) Johnson v. U.S.. 633 
A.2d 828 (d.C.App. 1993) quoting Hunter v. United States. 
548 A.2d 806, 810 n. 10 (D.C. 1988) (citations omitted) 
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POINT II 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROTECT THE PLAINTIFF'S DUE PROCESS 
BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER PLEA HEARING 
Furthermore the Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in 
his acceptance of his guilty plea because there was not sufficient 
protection of due process and Plaintiff's constitutional rights. 
The court has rightly pointed out the Godinez decision and it's 
clarifying there is but one standard for competency. But the court 
failed to note that Godinez determines there is a higher standard 
of inquiry required when a person is going to waive rights such as 
their waiving of counsel, waiving of constitutional rights in 
pleading guilty and waiving rights to a defense such as the 
insanity defense. 
In addition to determining that a defendant who 
seeks to plead guilty or waive counsel is competent, a 
trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of his 
constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary.(cites 
omitted) In this sense there is a "heightened19 standard 
for pleading guilty and for waiving the right to counsel, 
(insanity defense) but not a heightened standard of 
competence. Godinez v. Moran. (1993) 125 L. Ed. 2d 321, 
333 
Below are the sequences leading up to and including his plea 
and sentencing hearings and where there was compliance and/or 
failure to comply: 
1 Plaintiff filed motion for intention to use insanity 
defense. In compliance with Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, 77-14-
4(1). 
2 Trial court accepted motion over objection by prosecuting 
attorney, Mel Wilson, and ordered Dr. Ghicadus and Dr. Kimball to 
determine mental state of Plaintiff at time crime was committed. 
This was in compliance with Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, 77-14-
4(1). 
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3 The Dr.'s filed their report with the court and provided 
copies to the prosecution and defense. The points made were as 
follows: (both Dr.s had same basic points) 
A. Identified Plaintiff's dysfunction as Borderline 
Personality disorder. 
B. They both found Plaintiff mentally competent to 
stand trial. 
C. They could not determine Plaintiff's state of 
mind at time of crime because of memory loss. 
D. Both Dr.'s identified possible brain damage or 
other possibilities for memory loss. 
E. Both expressed need for additional evaluation and 
testing to determine cause of memory loss and mental 
state of Plaintiff at time of crime. 
This was filed in compliance with Utah Code of Criminal Procedure. 
77-14-4(2). 
4 Before the trial court accepted plea of guilty. The 
following procedures or safeguards should have occurred but did not 
occur: 
A. The court did not authorize the additional examination and 
testing requested by both Dr.s. This prevented trial court from 
being informed of Plaintiff's mental condition at time of crime and 
most likely of the information that he suffered from MPD. 
The judge must nevertheless, make a determination as 
to whether defendant1 s amnesia would lead to a denial of 
due process...91 People v Douglas, 527 N.Y.S.2d 151 (Sup. 
1988) quoting People v. Francabandera, supra, at 436, 354 
N.Y.S.2d 609, 310 N.E.2d 292) 
This also denied the Plaintiff the knowledge of the insanity 
defense. 
Indigent defendant entitled to "investigative expert or 
other services necessary for an adequate defense11 18 
U.S.C $ 3006A(e) (1) (1982 & III 1985) see United States v. 
Crews. 781 F.2d 826, 833-34 (10th Cir. 1986} (Habeas, P 8 
L 24-25, P 9 L 1-3) 
B. Prosecutor did not file or serve upon the defendant notice 
of rebuttal of the defense of mental illness, with names of 
witnesses he proposes to call in rebuttal.Utah Code of Criminal 
Procedure. 77-14-4(3). 
C. There is no record of defendant ever withdrawing his intent 
to use insanity defense. 
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As with waiver of all rights, waiver of an NGI (Not 
Guilty by reason of Insanity) plea must satisfy certain 
conditions in order to be constitutionally valid. In 
particularr the defendant must be capable of making and 
must actually make an intelligent and voluntary decision. 
This requires the trial court to "conduct and 
inquiry designed to assure that the defendant has been 
fully informed of the alternatives available, comprehends 
the consequences of failing to assert the [insanity] 
defense, and freely chooses to raise or waive the 
defense.State v. Jones, 664 P.2d 1216, 1221 (Wash. 1983); 
Frendak. at 380; State v. Khan, 175 N.J.Super. 72, 82, 
417 A.2d 585 (1985) 
D. There is no record of the trial court questioning Plaintiff 
to determine if withdrawal of intent to use insanity defense was 
knowing and voluntary with Plaintiff understanding all of the 
possible ramifications of withdrawing such a plea. 
(defendant waiving counsel [or insanity defense]) must be 
"made aware of the dangers and disadvantages...so that 
the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing 
and his choice is made with eyes open'" Godinez v. Moran. 
(1993) 125 L Ed 2d 321, 333. quoting Adams v. United 
States ex rel. McCann. 317 US 269, 279, 87 L Ed 268, 63 
S Ct 236, 143 ALR 435 (1942); Bovkin v. Alabama. 395 US, 
at 244, 23 L Ed 2d 274, 89 S Ct 1709 (1969). 
E. There was no formal or informal determination that 
Plaintiff was competent. 
5. The charges were not read to Plaintiff, in plea hearing no 
statement or recital of evidence was ever presented. 
a reviewing court must find evidence presented at 
the taking of the plea which strongly suggests the guilt 
of the accused, (emphasis added) State v. Stilling, 856 
P.2d 666, 673 (Utah App. 1993) 
The State must "properly establish a complete 
factual basis, containing every element of the crime, in 
its recitation to the trial court of what the state's 
evidence would show if the case had proceeded to trial." 
Id. see 674 quoting State v. Draper. 162 Arz. 433, 784 
P.2d 259, 262 (1989) see also People v. Douglas. 527 
N.Y.S.2d 151 (Sup 1988), People v. Francabandera, supra, 
at 438, 354 N.Y.S.2d 609, 310 N.E.2d 292), United States 
v. Owen. 858 F.2d 1514, 1517 (11th Cir. 1988) 
6. Trial court proceeded to accept a guilty plea, whereupon 
defendant's attorney interrupts with a colloquy concerning 
Plaintiff's lack of memory for crime and which includes a statement 
to the effect that the best they could hope for in a trial would be 
"manslaughter and attempted manslaughter" • This is a lesser charge 
than he pled to. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has ruled a requirement for 
pre-Gibbons guilty pleas that the record must reveal 
either facts that would support the prosecution of a 
defendant at trial or facts that would suggest a 
defendant faces a substantial risk of conviction at trial 
"not merely facts establishing the defendant's motivation 
for entering the plea." (emphasis added) State v. 
Stilling. 856 P.2d 666, 672 (Utah App. 1993) citing 
(Willett v, Barnes, 842 P.2d 860, 862) 
The court's colloquy with Stilling does not address 
the State's case against stilling and the elements of the 
offenses, but compared the first degree felony charges to 
the second degree felony charges and explained the 
different penalties that attached to each. Therefore, it 
did not add to the trial court's or this court's ability 
to assess...[a] factual basis for the charges._Id^_ 
7. Trial court then asks Plaintiff if he has anything to say 
to which Plaintiff replies with a request for an evaluation because 
he has "no memory of it." To which the trial court replies "that 
will come later." 
When a defendant claims inability to stand trial due 
to amnesia proved to be genuine, motion should be made 
for determination whether, under all the circumstances 
and with regard to the nature of the crime and the 
availability of evidence to the defendant, it is likely 
he can receive a fair trial.(emphasis added) People v. 
Francabandera. 310 N.E.2d 292 
8. Trial court then asks questions to determine if Plaintiff 
understands plea and is knowingly making plea. Never does trail 
court ask any questions to determine if plea is voluntary, if 
Plaintiff was promised anything or if he was coerced, nor does he 
inform Plaintiff of the need for "specific intent" to be 
demonstrated to be found guilty of 2nd or 1st degree murder. 
In addition to determining that a defendant who 
seeks to plead guilty or waive counsel is competent, a 
trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of his 
constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary.(cites 
omitted) In this sense there is a "heightened11 standard 
for pleading guilty and for waiving the right to counsel, 
(insanity defense) but not a heightened standard of 
competence. Godinez v. Moran. (1993) 125 L Ed 2d 321, 333 
The United States Supreme court imposed on state 
courts, as a constitutional requirement, a definition of 
"voluntariness" announced by this Court in McCarthy v 
United States. 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 
418 (1969), in which the Court interpreted a provision of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
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McCarthy extended the definition of voluntariness to 
include an "understanding of the essential elements of 
the crime charged, including the requirement of specific 
intent...," 394 U.S., at 471, 89 S.Ct., at 1173. 
Both the defense attorney and the trial court 
detailed the sentences that might be served but nowhere 
is it indicated that the 2nd degree murder entailed the 
Petitioner having an "intent to harm or injure the 
victim". Nor did he make a factual statement or 
admission necessarily implying that he had such intent. 
In point of fact he stated he had "no memory of it". (Plea 
Hearing) 
9. Trial court asks Plaintiff if he is ready to plead guilty 
and Plaintiff answers "To get this over with" 
During the fourth day of trial defense counsel moved 
to allow the defendant to plead guilty and mentally ill 
on all counts. The defendant again testified and 
declared that he had previously lied and now wished "to 
get it over with."...Apparently concluding that the 
defendant's request was not made in a wholly deliberate 
and knowing manner, the judge refused the plea...The 
trial judge appears to have acted to protect the 
defendant from an act he might have later wanted to 
reverse. State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1237 (Utah 1989) 
10. Trial court states that pre-sentence report of more value 
to him than a 90 day evaluation or psychological evaluations. 
Pre-sentence report was prepared by Susan 8. Wilson, 
wife of Mel Wilson one of the prosecuting attorneys is 
this case and the one who gave the prosecutors statement, 
which is very inflammatory. The preparation of this 
report by someone connected with one of the participating 
parties is in itself a violation of the Plaintiff's 
rights. The report itself contains many erroneous 
statements and accusations concerning the Plaintiff that 
were not substantiated by the preparer of the report. 
The preparer was not licensed nor qualified to provide 
insight as to the mental or emotional state of the 
Plaintiff. 
11. In sentencing the trial court cited his own feelings and 
opinions as to the mental and emotional condition of the Plaintiff, 
never citing or referring to evaluations prepared by Dr.'s and 
drawing conclusions not in the Dr.'s evaluations. See sentencing 
transcript or Reply Brief. 
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POINT III 
HABEAS COURT SHOULD HAVE DETERMINED, BY THE RECORD, 
IF TRIAL COURT PROTECTED ALL OF PLAINTIFF'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS, 
NOT TRIED TO DETERMINE HIS COMPETENCY 
This is an appeal from a plea bargain where no evidence was 
presented. In fact the very lack of evidence is, in itself, 
condemning evidence for the trial court. There was no presentation 
of evidence to the trial court, no inquiry by the trial court to 
determine if the Plaintiff waived his insanity defense knowingly 
and voluntarily, no questioning to determine if his guilty plea was 
voluntary and therefore the only possible evidence to marshall 
would be the Dr.'s evaluations and the court records to see if the 
trial court did try to determine if Plaintiff knowingly and 
voluntarily plead guilty, and these we have dealt with above. The 
habeas court had testimony of Dr. Carlisle and Dr. Jeppsen who both 
diagnosed Plaintiff with MPD. He did rely heavily on Plaintiff's 
statements at the plea 
hearing, as does the state and this court. The court room demeanor 
of the Plaintiff and his answers may be used to support a decision 
of incompetency but may not by used to support ruling of competency 
and therefore cannot be considered evidence used to support the 
habeas court's decision or this courts decision. 
As was the case here, a defendant suffering from 
this illness may outwardly act logically and consistently 
but nonetheless be unable to make decisions on the basis 
of a realistic evaluation of his own best interests. 
Laffertv v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1555 (10th cir. 1991) 
also see Bouchillon, 907 F.2d at 593-94. 
By failing to make the distinction set out above, 
the dissent incorrectly relies on cases such as (cite 
omitted) which involve the denial of a hearing, as 
11 
support for its argument that we should look at trial 
demeanor to support a competency determination made prior 
to trial.Id, 
Such a hearing (competency) "is not required if 
there is a pre-plea determination of competence based on 
a psychiatric evaluation and no new factual issues 
pertaining to competence are raised in the motion to 
withdraw the plea."(emphasis added) Johnson v. U.S., 633 
A.2d 828 (d.C.App. 1993) quoting Hunter v. United States. 
548 A.2d 806, 810 n. 10 (D.C. 1988) (citations omitted) 
However, a petitioner is not required to disprove 
the state fact finding by convincing evidence until and 
unless that finding has been held entitled to the 
presumption of correctness. The threshold question is 
whether the competency determination is fairly supported 
by the record. Laffertv v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 
1991) See Demosthenes v Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 110 S.Ct 
2223, 2225, 109 L.Ed.2d 762 (1990). 
...[0]ur initial inquiry must be to assess whether the 
presumption is applicable here. Thus, we must ascertain 
whether the competency determination was made under a 
correct view of the law, and if so, whether it is fairly 
supported by the record, considering "that part of the 
record of the State court proceeding in which the 
determination of such factual issue was made, id. 28 
U.S.C. $ 2254(d) 
Plaintiff maintains habeas court erred if finding him 
competent when he should have been determining if Plaintiff's due 
process was violated. 
When, on the other hand, no state court competency 
hearing has been held and the defendant has proceeded to 
trial without such a hearing, the issue is not whether 
the state record supports a finding of competency. 
Rather the inquiry on habeas is whether the state court 
denied the defendant his right to due process by ignoring 
evidence, including evidence at trial, indicating that 
the defendant might not be competent, and that a hearing 
to ascertain competency was therefore required. Laffertv 
v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1555 (10th cir. 1991) 
CONCLUSION 
The question is not was the Plaintiff competent but is there 
a possibility that had the trial court known that the Plaintiff 
12 
suffered from MPD he would have found him incompetent and sent him 
for treatment? Did the trial court deprive Plaintiff of possible 
defense and, thus his due process rights? The Plaintiff had put 
the trial court on alert when he filed his intent to use insanity 
defense. The Dr.'s alerted the trial court the problem was more 
complex and asked for additional investigation. Dr. Carlisle and 
Dr. Jeppsen verified that there was a complex problem, MPD, which 
is reasonable to assume would have been discovered by additional 
investigation 
The discrepancy between Dr.'s testimony concerning what was 
occurring between Plaintiff's personalities lends further weight to 
the fact that this was a complex dysfunction that couldn't be 
quickly identified and the additional investigation was necessary. 
The courtroom demeanor is valueless both because it is inadmissible 
as evidence of competency and as in this case, you can't tell by 
looking and listening if one or more personalities are out and if 
they are communicating with each other. 
The Plaintiff therefore requests the court grant a rehearing 
and reconsider his case. The Plaintiff requests that he be given 
the right and opportunity he would have had if he had been able to 
use the insanity defense, namely to have his day in court. Then 
the state will have an opportunity to mount their case against him 
and he the opportunity, given by the constitution to participate in 
his own defense. 
a reviewing court must find evidence presented at 
the taking of the plea which strongly suggests the guilt 
of the accused. Without such strong evidence, refusal to 
permit the withdrawal of the plea would result in the 
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anachronism of forcing a conviction to stand without 
evidence of guilt, (emphasis added) State v. Stilling, 856 
P.2d 666, 673 (Utah App. 1993) 
The Plaintiff maintains that to deny him this writ and the 
opportunity to go to trial is forcing /his conviction to stand 
without evidence of guilt. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /(t^7/ day of June, 1994. 
reroxa D. McPhee 
attorney for the Appellant 
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